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Introduction 
Wouldn’t it be ironic if Donald Trump were to go down in history 
as “the human rights president”?  Given Amnesty International’s 
conclusion that President Trump’s policies mark a “new era of human 
rights regression,”1 such a proposition may seem far-fetched. But this 
essay suggests that the April 14, 2018 airstrikes that he ordered on 
Syria, to prevent its use of chemical weapons, may have crystallized 
an emerging customary norm of humanitarian intervention, thereby 
representing a historic development in international human rights 
law.  
Since 2011, Syria has been engulfed in a protracted civil war that 
began as part of the wave of Arab Spring protests against Middle 
East tyrants.2  The Syrian conflict has seen the rise and fall of the 
 
* Dean of the Law School, Joseph C. Hostetler--BakerHostetler Professor 
of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; co-founder and 
Managing Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group; 
former Attorney Adviser for United Nations Affairs, U.S. Department of 
State. This essay is an edited version of a speech delivered at the 
Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Conference, “International 
Law and Policy in the Age of Trump,” at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law on September 14, 2018. 
1. Amnesty International State of the World’s Human Rights Annual 
Report 2017-2018, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/amnesty-international-state-of-
the-worlds-human-rights-annual-report-2017-18/ 
[https://perma.cc/E9F2-FKFD] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
2. See Timeline of Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria, YAHOO! (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://www.yahoo.com/news/timeline-chemical-weapons-
attacks-syria-170615069.html [https://perma.cc/7U95-YL6N] (detailing 
the timeline of events related to Syria’s use of chemical weapons and the 
U.S., French, and U.K. airstrikes). 
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ISIS terrorist organization,3 the largest refugee migration since World 
War II,4 and the repeated use of chemical weapons against a civilian 
population.5  With all that, Syria has become a dynamic laboratory 
for the creation of new customary international law. Elsewhere, I have 
explored how the use of force by the United States and its allies 
against ISIS in Syria has fundamentally changed the international law 
of self-defense against non-state actors.6  This essay, in turn, examines 
whether the April 2018 airstrikes against Syria may have constituted 
a tipping point7 in the evolving customary international law8 of 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
3. See Michael P. Scharf, How the War on ISIS Changed International 
Law, 48 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L LAW 15 (2016) (discussing efforts of the 
U.S. and other Western and Arab countries to defeat ISIS within Syria). 
4. See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018 
Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, RELIEFWEB 
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/2018-
humanitarian-needs-overview-syrian-arab-republic-enar 
[https://perma.cc/C9KT-DPVP] (discussing the impact of the Syrian 
conflict, including the number of refugees); see also Laura Tavares, Text 
to Text: Comparing Jewish Refugees of the 1930s With Syrian Refugees 
Today, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/learning/lesson-plans/text-to-
text-comparing-jewish-refugees-of-the-1930s-with-syrian-refugees-
today.html [https://perma.cc/EH5R -ZXCL] (comparing the current 
Syrian refugee crisis with the Jewish refugee crisis of World War II). 
5. See Timeline of Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria, supra note 2 
(outlining uses of chemical weapons on Syrian civilians). 
6. See Scharf, supra note 3. 
7. In my writings, I have described the tipping points and transformative 
events that fundamentally change customary international law as 
“Grotian Moments” -- a term named for Hugo Grotius, the 15th Century 
Dutch scholar and diplomat whose masterpiece De Jure Belli ac Pacis 
helped marshal in the modern system of international law. See generally, 
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (2014) 
(discussing transformative events in international law). Grotius (1583–
1645) is widely considered to have laid the intellectual architecture for 
the Peace of Westphalia, which launched the basic rules of modern 
international law. HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 75-78 
(Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1992). While the results of Westphalia may 
have been simplified by the lens of history, and Grotius’ role may have 
been exaggerated, Westphalia has unquestionably emerged as a symbolic 
marker and Grotius as an emblematic figure of changing historical 
thought. “Grotian Moment” is thus an apt label for transformational 
events in customary international law.    
8. Customary international law means “those rules of international law 
that derive from and reflect a general practice accepted as law.” Int’l 
Law Comm’n, Second Rep. on the Identification of Customary 
International Law, U.N. Dᴏᴄ. A/CN.4/672, 65 (May 22, 2014). 
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The International Law Prohibiting Unauthorized 
Humanitarian Intervention 
In the 1986 Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice 
observed that “[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an 
unprecedented exception to the principle [of non-intervention] might, 
if shared in principle by other States, tend toward a modification of 
customary international law.”9 In the years since the 1999 NATO 
airstrikes on Serbia to prevent the slaughter of the Kosovar 
Albanians,10 international law has been moving in fits and starts 
toward recognition of a limited right of humanitarian intervention. 
Under the conventional view of international law, use of force 
against another State is legally justified only in three instances: (1) 
with permission of the territorial state, (2) with the authorization of 
the U.N. Security Council, or (3) when it constitutes self-defense in 
response to an armed attack.11  Humanitarian Intervention without 
Security Council approval was not viewed as a valid justification.12 
However, the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia saw a major 
application of armed force for humanitarian purposes without Security 
Council authorization, but with widespread support by the 
international community. According to one scholar, the NATO 
intervention was “a case that expanded, rather than breached, the 
law, similar to the Truman proclamation about the continental 
shelf.”13 Others have described the NATO intervention as “a 
watershed event” and “an important transition point in the shift from 
 
9. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 207 (June 27). 
10. Patrick T. Egan, The Kosovo Intervention and Collective Self-Defense, 8 
INT’L PEACEKEEPING 39, 40 (2001). 
11. See Scharf, supra note 3, at 22. 
12. Prior to the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, there had been several 
cases where foreign intervention was employed to halt widespread 
atrocities without Security Council approval.  Hence, India stopped the 
slaughter in East Pakistan in 1971, Tanzania ended Idi Amin’s mass 
killing in Uganda in 1979, and Vietnam’s intervention brought an end to 
Pol Pot’s killing fields in Cambodia in 1978.  But unlike the 1999 
Kosovo intervention, in these three cases self-defense, rather than 
humanitarian concern, was the primary justification asserted. The fact 
that the intervening States relied on self-defense, rather than asserting a 
right to humanitarian intervention, undermined arguments that the law 
had changed. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Reflections on the Legality and 
Legitimacy of NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo, in THE KOSOVO 
TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS 145, 150 (Ken Booth ed., 
2001).    
13. Fernando R. Teson, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of 
Humanitarian Intervention, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 42, 43 (2009). 
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one international order to the next.”14 Moreover, the NATO 
intervention led to the ICISS’s articulation of the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine, a concept that has been described as the “most 
dramatic normative development of our time”15 and a “revolution in 
consciousness in international affairs.”16 The 2001 ICISS Report 
characterized the responsibility to protect as an emerging principle of 
customary international law,17 and the 2005 High-level Panel Report 
described it as an “emerging norm,”18 an assessment shared by the 
Secretary-General.19 
Yet, a major roadblock prevented humanitarian intervention 
without Security Council authorization from ripening into a norm of 
customary international law on the basis of the 1999 NATO action: 
the participating NATO States were not comfortable with the idea 
that the bombing campaign would create a new rule of customary 
international law justifying a broad notion of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention that could be subject to abuse.20 Thus, in July 1999, U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stressed that the air strikes 
were a “unique situation sui generis in the region of the Balkans,” 
concluding that it was important “not to overdraw the various lessons 
that come out of it.”21 And UK Prime Minister Tony Blair similarly 
 
14. Heiko Borchert & Mary N. Hampton, The Lessons of Kosovo: Boon or 
Bust for Transatlantic Security?, ORBIS 369 (2002). 
15. Ramesh Thakur & Thomas G. Weis, R2P: From Idea to Norm – and 
Action?, 1 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 22, 23 (2009). 
16. Jeremy Sarkin, Is the Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm of 
International Law in the post-Libya Era?, 1 GRONINGEN J. OF INT’L L. 
11, 16 (2012) (quoting Tod Lindberg, Blog, Protect the People, TOD 
LINDBERG, (Sept. 27, 2005), 
https://todlindberg.net/2005/09/27/protect-the-people/#more-415 
[https://perma.cc/RL3P-W36V]). 
17. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS] ¶ 2.24, 6.17 (2001). 
18. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
19. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/2005/Add.3 (May 26, 2005) (affirming the U.N.’s responsibility to 
protect human rights around the world).  
20. Anne-Sophie Massa, Does Humanitarian Intervention Serve Human 
Rights? The Case of Kosovo, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 49, 58-59 (2009).  
21. Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Press 
Conference with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, (July 26, 1999), 
available at http://secretary.state.gov./www/statements/1999/ 
990726b.html [https://perma.cc/HU66-BVL7]. 
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emphasized the exceptional nature of the Kosovo operation and the 
limited precedent it created.22 
The reason for the reluctance of the United States and United 
Kingdom to acknowledge a precedent that could ripen into customary 
international law was explained by Michael Matheson, the Acting 
Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State at the time of the 
intervention, in the following terms: 
“About six months before the actual conflict, at the time when 
NATO was considering giving an order to threaten the use of 
force, the political community of NATO got together and had a 
discussion about what the basis of such threat of force would be.  
At the end of the discussion, it was clear that there was no 
common agreement on what might be the justification.  There 
were some NATO members who were prepared to base it on a 
new doctrine of humanitarian intervention; but most members 
of the NATO Council were reluctant to adopt a relatively open-
ended new doctrine.  So at the end of that week, the NATO 
political community said, here is a list of all of the important 
reasons why it is necessary for us to threaten the use of force.  
And at the bottom, it said that under these unique 
circumstances, we think such actions would be legitimate.  
There was deliberate evasion of making a “legal” assertion. 
And this same process occurred in the U.S. Government.  There 
were some who wanted to articulate that humanitarian 
intervention is now the basis for U.S. action.  There was 
another theory from the Department of Defense, which wanted 
to adopt sort of an expanded idea of self-defense based on the 
general interest of the United States in the region; but on 
reflection, nobody was really prepared to throw all the eggs into 
either of those baskets.  So we ended up with a formulation 
similar to that of NATO, where we listed all of the reasons why 
we were taking action and, in the end, mumbled something 
about its being justifiable and legitimate but not a precedent.  
So in a sense, it was something less than a definitive legal 
rationale – although it probably was taken by large parts of the 
public community as something like that.”23 
When the principal State actors assert that their actions are sui 
generis and not intended to constitute precedent, this does not create 
 
22. 330 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (1999) col. 30 (UK). 
23. MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN 
TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE 
DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 124-125 (2010) (quoting remarks by 
Michael Matheson).  
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a favorable climate for the cultivation of a new rule of customary 
international law.24 
In the years since the 1999 NATO action, countries have used 
force for humanitarian purposes without Security Council 
authorization on several other occasions, including the U.S./U.K 
imposition of a no-fly zone over Iraq to protect the Marsh Arabs from 
Saddam Hussein’s reprisals,25 the Russian invasion of South Ossetia 
Georgia ostensibly to protect ethnic Russians living there from 
attack,26 and the U.S. airstrikes against the ISIS terrorist group to 
save the besieged Yazidis on Mount Sinjar, Iraq.27 But never before 
the April 14, 2018 airstrikes had humanitarian use of force been 
accompanied by a clear legal justification based on a right of 
humanitarian intervention. Two former State Department Legal 
Advisers, Harold Koh and John Bellinger, have criticized the United 
States’ failure to articulate a legal argument for its past humanitarian 
interventions.28  For customary international law to rapidly 
crystallize, norm pioneers must be consistent in their articulation of 
 
24. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 19-20 (1999). 
25. 363 Parl Deb HC (2001) col. 620 (UK). 
26. Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’: A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential 
Victims, 20 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 533, 559 (2008). 
27. See Helene Cooper & Michael D. Shear, Militants’ Siege on Mountain in 
Iraq is Over, Pentagon Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/world/middleeast/iraq-yazidi-
refugees.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3ZGC-NHW4]; see also Helene 
Cooper et al., Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS, N.Y. TIMES 




28. John Bellinger, The Trump Administration Should Do More to Explain 
the Legal Basis for the Syrian Airstrikes, LAWFARE: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, (Apr. 14, 2018, 4:46 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-
administration-should-do-more-explain-legal-basis-syrian-airstrikes 
[https://perma.cc/YAA6-RNM2] (noting Bellinger’s testimony before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “[w]hen the United States 
uses military force, especially under controversial circumstances, it 
should explain the legal basis for its actions.  When the United States 
does not do so, it appears to act lawlessly and invites other countries to 
act without a legal basis or justification.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, 
The Legal Adviser’s Duty to Explain, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 204 
(2016); see also Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and 
Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 977 (2016) (“I 
thought it outrageous that the U.S. government would fail to state a 
legal rationale to justify its use of force.”). 
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the new rule, its contours, and its application.29  The failure to do so 
not only makes it harder for customary international law to form, but 
at the same time it makes it easier for the precedent to be abused by 
other countries since its contours are left purposely ambiguous.   
What Made the 2018 Airstrikes Different? 
In contrast to the prior cases, the countries participating in the 
April 2018 airstrikes on Syria embraced a common justification—
humanitarian intervention—rather than cite only factual 
considerations that render use of force morally defensible as they had 
in the past.  The United Kingdom was the most explicit of the three, 
telling the Security Council that its actions were legally justified on 
the basis of “humanitarian intervention” in the context of preventing 
use of chemical weapons.30  It stated that “[a]ny State is permitted 
under international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in 
order to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering.”31   
The UK maintained that such humanitarian intervention is lawful 
when three conditions are met: 
(1)“First, there must be convincing evidence, generally accepted 
by the international community as a whole, of extreme 
humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and 
urgent relief. … 
(2)Secondly, it must be objectively clear that there is no 
practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be 
saved. … 
(3)Thirdly, the proposed use of force must be necessary and 
proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering. It 
must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim.”32 
The United Kingdom then detailed why it reasonably considers 
that the airstrikes met these requirements, concluding “[t]here was no 
 
29. SCHARF, supra note 7, at 1-5. 
30. Theresa May, Prime Minister, Prime Minister’s Office, Syria action – 
UK government legal position, (April 14, 2018), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-
government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position 
[https://perma.cc/RK2D-XWNS] (“The UK is permitted under 
international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in order to 
alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the 
use of force is humanitarian intervention….”). 
31. U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg. at 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8233 (Apr. 
14, 2018). 
32. Id. at 7. 
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practicable alternative to the truly exceptional use of force to degrade 
the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons capability and deter their 
further use by the Syrian regime in order to alleviate humanitarian 
suffering.”33  This clearly articulated legal rationale distinguishes the 
2018 airstrikes from the NATO action in 1999.  While the UK had 
first made public its views on humanitarian intervention in 2014,34 
this was the first time the rationale was tied to concrete action taken 
by armed UK forces.   
Although the United States did not similarly articulate a detailed 
justification, it did tell the Security Council that “[t]he United States 
is deeply grateful to the United Kingdom and France for their part in 
the coalition to defend the prohibition of chemical weapons.  We 
worked in lock step; we were in complete agreement.”35 As such, the 
United States can be held to have implicitly adopted the rationale of 
the United Kingdom.36  This is particularly significant because the 
United States has never before recognized a right of humanitarian 
intervention under international law.37 
In contrast to its statements following the U.S. airstrikes on 
Syria’s Shayrat airbase a year earlier, it is significant that in April 
2018 the United States did not employ the language of armed reprisal, 
as such is considered unlawful under international law.38  Thus, at the 
United Nations, the U.S. Ambassador stated, “[t]he United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States acted not in revenge, not in 
punishment and not in a symbolic show of force.  We acted to deter 
 
33. May, supra note 30. 
34. Further Supplementary Written Evidence from the Rt Hon Hugh 
Robertson, MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to 
the Foreign Affairs Committee on Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect, January 14, 2014, available at 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence 
/582/58205.htm [https://perma.cc/X2PM-ERPF]. 
35. U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg, supra note 31, at 6 (Emphasis 
added). 
36. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the International Law Commission on 
the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 52-54 (2001) 
(citing international cases where a State’s unequivocal acknowledgment 
and adoption of another’s position will render the State retroactively 
responsible for it). 
37. See Stephen Wertheim, A Solution from Hell: the United States and the 
Rise of Humanitarian Interventionism, 1991-2003, 12 J. OF GENOCIDE 
RES. 149, (2010) (discussing the United States initial reluctance to adopt 
humanitarian interventionism); see also Koh, The War Powers and 
Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 28. 
38. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Popular but Unlawful Armed Reprisal, 
44 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 325, 338-345 (2018) (discussing the illegality and 
background on the prohibition of armed reprisals). 
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the future use of chemical weapons by holding the Syrian regime 
responsible for its crimes against humanity.”39  
Importantly, the underlying humanitarian need in the case of the 
April 2018 airstrikes was to stop the use of chemical weapons against 
a civilian population – a jus cogens norm.40  Rather than target 
infrastructure, airfields, or government buildings, as had been the case 
of past humanitarian interventions, the targets of the April 2018 
strikes were chemical weapons production and storage facilities.41 
While a wider principle of humanitarian intervention might be too 
much for the international community to buy into at this time, the 
large majority of States supported or declined to protest the April 
2018 airstrikes out of concern with the Assad regime’s attempt to 
normalize the use of chemical weapons and Russia’s willingness to 
prevent the Security Council from taking action against Syria42  
Finally, out of a total of seventy States that publicly commented 
at the United Nations or elsewhere, only a small handful of countries 
said they opposed the April 2018 airstrikes,43 And only Russia, China, 
 
39. U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg, supra note 31, at 5. 
40. Charlie Dunlap, Do the Syria Strikes Herald a New Norm of 
International Law?, LAWFARE (Apr. 14, 2018), 
https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2018/04/14/do-the-syria-strikes-herald-a-
new-norm-of-international-law/ [https://perma.cc/VK9N-8385]. The 
term “jus cogens” designates a peremptory principle or norm from which 
no derogation is permitted.  Jus cogens norms are recognized as being 
fundamental to the maintenance of the international legal order. 
41. Id. The 1999 NATO airstrikes comprised a 78-day bombing campaign of 
Serbia’s infrastructure, military targets, and government buildings. 
Serbia marks anniversary of start of NATO bombing, B92 (Mar. 24, 
2016), 
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/society.php?yyyy=2016&mm=03&dd=2
4&nav_id=97466 [https://perma.cc/89RZ-EU84]. The April 2017 
airstrikes targeted an airbase in general use. Michael R. Gordon et al., 




42. Jan Lemnitzer, Syria Strikes Violated International Law – Are the Rules 




43. Fifty-six separate states and NATO (consisting of 28 member States) – 
for a total of over seventy countries -- publicly expressed opinions about 
the April 14, 2018 airstrikes. Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg et al., 
Mapping States Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018, JUST 
SECURITY (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org 
/55157/mapping-states-reactions-syria-strikes-april-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/8QZD-3ZWQ]. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Responding to Chemical Weapons Use in Syria 
198 
and Bolivia voted for the Security Council resolution condemning the 
attack.44  Russia’s opposition to the claim that the airstrikes were 
justified as humanitarian intervention was weakened by its argument 
that Syria’s responsibility for the chemical attack had not been 
sufficiently proven,45 and by the fact that it had itself invoked the 
right of humanitarian intervention just ten years earlier in the case of 
South Ossetia, Georgia.46 Similarly China’s position was weakened by 
its failure to object to the United States’ airstrikes against the Syrian 
airfield in 2017, and the fact that its vote in April 2018 came at the 
height of a U.S.-China trade war.47  
Some commentators have argued that even if there was a newly 
emergent customary international law right to humanitarian 
intervention, customary international law simply cannot prevail over 
 
44. U.N. SCOR, Russian Federation Draft Resolution, UN Doc. S/2018/355 
(Apr. 14, 2018). The draft resolution stated: 
“The Security Council, 
Appalled by the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by 
the US and its allies in violation of international law and the 
UN Charter,  
Expressing grave concern that the aggression against the 
sovereign territory of the Syrian Arab Republic took place at the 
moment when the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons Fact-Finding Mission team has just begun its work to 
collect evidence of the alleged use of chemical weapons in 
Douma and urging to provide all necessary conditions for the 
completion of this investigation,  
1. Condemns the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic 
by the US and its allies in violation of international law and the 
UN Charter, 
2. Demands that the US and its allies immediately and without 
delay cease the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and 
demands also to refrain from any further use of force in violation 
of international law and the UN Charter, 
3. Decides to remain further seized on this matter.” 
 
45. U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg, supra note 31, at 3-5. Russia told the 
Security Council, “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-
Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic 
substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside 
Damascus.  Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian 
military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.” 
Id. at 3.  
46. Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 26; see also RONALD D. ASMUS, A LITTLE 
WAR THAT SHOOK THE WORLD: GEORGIA, RUSSIA, AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE WEST 8 (2010) (introducing the conflict in South Ossetia).  
47. A Timeline of the U.S. and China Trade War, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 
6, 2018), https://www.digitalcommerce 360.com/2018/07/06/timeline-of-the-
trump-china-trade-war/ [https://perma.cc/C2PB-G547]. 
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the U.N. Charter.48 But as former State Department Legal Adviser 
Harold Koh points out, “[it] is not nearly so black and white as the 
absolutists claim, because textual ambiguity in Article 2(4), the 
broader structural purposes of the U.N. Charter, and some recent 
significant state practice give far more legal play in the joints than 
textual absolutists would concede.”49  If the right of humanitarian 
intervention in response to use of chemical weapons now exists under 
customary international law, then such humanitarian intervention 
would not be in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter because 
that provision only prohibits the use of force that is “against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and 
“inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”50 
Humanitarian intervention, in contrast, is consistent with the 
Charter’s Purposes and Principles, which include “maintain[ing] 
international peace and security,” “promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights,” and “sav[ing] succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war.”51 Humanitarian intervention in response to the use of 
chemical weapons is not seeking to threaten the integrity of a State 
nor bring about political change, but only to save lives and enforce 
the global ban on chemical weapons.52     
Conclusion 
Since the Security Council declined to condemn the April 2018 
airstrikes on Syria, the question that this essay addresses—whether a 
limited customary international law right of humanitarian 
intervention has crystallized from the 2018 Syrian airstrikes—may not 
require a definitive answer at this time as there is no pending 
International Court of Justice or International Criminal Court case 
arguing that the strikes were an unlawful act of aggression.  
Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that the April 2018 airstrikes 
 
48. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, The Legality of the UK’s Air Strikes on the 
Assad Government in Syria (Apr. 6, 2018), available at 
https://www.scribd.com/document/3y76483861/Akande-Opinion-UK-
Government-s-Legal-Position-on-Syria-Strike-April-2018 (opinion letter 
prepared for MP Tom Watson, Deputy Leader of the UK Labour 
Party). 
49. Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 28, 
at 1017.  
50. Richard Ware, Briefing Paper: The Legal Basis for Air Strikes Against 
Syrian Government Targets, House of Commons Library (Apr. 16, 
2018), available at 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/ 
CBP-8287 [https://perma.cc/5XEV-UJER]. 
51. U.N. Charter art. 1 ¶ 1; U.N. Charter pmbl. 
52. Ware, supra note 50. 
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constituted a tipping point for humanitarian intervention. Advocates 
of a right of humanitarian intervention should be careful, however, in 
reading this development too broadly, for there is unlikely to be 
widespread international approval at this time for its application 
outside the context of responding to repeated use of chemical weapons 
against civilians. 
 
